Introduction

Rail safety charitable trust TrackSAFE Foundation New Zealand (TrackSAFE) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the consultation by NZ Transport Agency Waka Kotahi (NZTA), acting on behalf of the Ministry of Transport, regarding proposed rule changes aimed at reducing administrative requirements for heavy vehicles.

Given our focus of safety on the rail network, and particularly the interaction between road freight (heavy vehicles) and level crossings, we submit that the proposed changes require explicit safeguards to mitigate increased level-crossing collision risk.

Increasing level crossing collision risk from longer heavy vehicles

Specifically, we draw attention to the risk posed by heavy vehicles at short stacked level crossings. This low probability, high consequence risk was exacerbated by the amendments to the Land Transport Rule: Vehicle Dimensions and Mass (VDAM) in 2010. From this time VDAM allowed for the permitting of longer High Productivity Motor Vehicles (HPMVs, including 50MAX). This largely included new HPMV configurations of 22-23 meters, with a few permitted to operate at 25 meters.

The introduction of HPMVs (including 50MAX) has exacerbated the short stacking risk, increasing the probability of serious collisions with trains. There are 362 level crossings nationwide that are ‘short stacked’. This is where larger vehicles of a certain length (trucks, coaches and buses) do not fit between the tracks and the adjacent local road or state highway. While the vehicle is stationary as it waits to move into the local road or state highway, it unavoidably has a portion of it sitting prone within the rail corridor. This poses a clear risk of collision with trains. This situation has long been tolerated despite that under the Railways Act, trains have legal right of way. Practically, trains are also ordinarily unable to stop in sufficient time to avoid a collision.

Need to urgently mitigate short stacking risks on level crossings

We note that the previous changes to VDAM increasing the permitted lengths of HPMVs were developed and implemented without any obvious consideration of (or mitigation for) the impact this would have on increasing risk at railway level crossings, particularly where there is a short stacking issue. The need to mitigate this increased risk was later acknowledged by the NZTA through its strategic priority work programme for freight in 2015-2018. As a result, funding to ameliorate the short stacking collision risk at several level crossings on or adjacent to a state highway was included in the National Land Transport Programme 2015-2018.

Short stacked level crossings are also a concern for the Transport Accident Investigation Commission (TAIC). The increasing collision risk has accordingly been on TAIC’s Watchlist since 2017. TAIC’s concerns were triggered by the fatal level crossing collision between a truck and a freight train at Lambert Road level crossing, near Kawerau in 2017 (refer: TAIC, Rail inquiry RO-2017-105). While the 2017 Kawerau collision was not caused by short stacking, it highlighted the high consequence impacts of a collision between a train and a heavy vehicle. The severity of such a high consequence risk is further exacerbated by the potential of the train and/or heavy vehicle involved in a potential crash carrying passengers.

Progression of serious and fatal level cross crashes

Other notable collisions involving heavy vehicles since 2014 include:

• 9 July 2014 – fatal collision between truck and freight train in Ashburton.
  
• 27 February 2014 – fatal collision with truck and long-distance passenger train at Te Onetea Road level crossing, Rangiriri.
  
• 4 September 2017 – collision between freight train and truck at Lake Street level crossing Invercargill
  
• 16 September 2020 – fatal collision between school bus and freight locomotive at Cleverley Road level crossing, Manawatū.
  
• 13 May 2021 - fatal collision between freight train and truck at Saunders Road level crossing near Marton.
  
• 15 October 2025 – collision between freight train and truck at Elizabeth Street level crossing in Waikanae.

This crash history suggests a significant level crossing crash involving a heavy vehicle every 1-3 years (average probability of 1.83 crashes every two years). It should be noted that between 1 July 2016 and 24 September 2025 there have been 366 near collisions between trains and heavy vehicles at level crossings (recorded in KiwiRail’s Operational Reporting Architecture database “ORA”). As freight volumes increase, so will the movements of HPMVs and freight trains. Passenger train movements are also increasing, particularly in urban and peri-urban Auckland, in the lower North Island and on scenic lines around the country. This will increase the crash risk exposure, so increasing the probability of a significant crash in the future.

It is worth also noting, from a cost/benefit perspective that level crossing crashes, including those not involving fatalities, often cause significant rail and road network disruption. This can result in lengthy and costly delays to passenger movements and nationally significant freight supply chains.

Specific concerns for railway intrusion due to congestion within urban Auckland

Additional to the short stacking risk is the potential for vehicles to be ‘stuck’ within the railway corridor while in congestion. Drivers will sometimes overestimate their ability to cross and clear railway lines, meaning their vehicles becomes stationary within the rail corridor. This represents a clear collision risk. The introduction of HPMVs has also marginally increased this risk, which is most pronounced in Auckland due to the high number of at-grade level crossings, increasing motor vehicle movements and increasing frequency of passenger rail services.

Overview of the proposed changes

Given the above, the consultation identifies two key provisions of interest to TrackSAFE:

•The removal of the 44 T–50MAX permit requirement: vehicles weighing between 44 tonnes and 50 tonnes (“50MAX”) currently require a permit under the Vehicle Dimensions and Mass (VDAM) Rule; the proposal would remove this requirement where the vehicle meets certain design standards and operates on pre-approved routes.

•The removal of the requirement to display H plates: High Productivity Motor Vehicles (HPMVs) currently display yellow “H” plates (or stickers) to show they hold a permit under the VDAM Rule; the proposal would remove that visible plate requirement while operators would still need valid permits or documentation, and enforcement agencies would rely on internal records rather than visible signage.

Key safety concern: heavy vehicles and level crossing risk

Our specific concern is that HPMVs (including 50MAX) pose an elevated risk at road-rail level crossings — especially at crossings with short stacking distances. The removal of the requirement for H plates and permits will increase this risk, unless the safety risk on level crossings is mitigated.

The continued identification of HPMVs with H plates provides some benefit in having their use of the land transport system movements more visible and manageable. As these are longer and/or heavier vehicles than those that have unrestricted general access, there is still a need to have a system in place to track and restrict their movements, particularly over level crossings where short stacking is an identified safety risk.

Similarly, the continued use of permits provides the ability to continue managing local road and state highway access. This includes placing restrictions on routes that are unsuitable for HPMV access, including level crossings, rail bridge underpasses and bridges that are not designed to carry higher mass vehicles. When sufficient alternative systems are in place, such as mandatory real-time electronic route monitoring, then a removal of the permit system could be considered. Similarly, we urge that:

•level-crossing risk must be a considered element in route approval (and continuing monitoring) for HPMVs / 50MAX operations; and •funding is increased to address high risk rail level crossings, including those with short stacking.

In essence, removing visible controls and oversight will weaken a layer of risk mitigation at the road-rail interface. While the probability of level crossing crashes is low, due to the physical forces involved they often involve fatalities and life changing serious injuries. With the increase in freight movements and passenger trains, there is also a growing risk of more catastrophic collisions. Crashes involving passenger vehicles and/or passenger trains could also therefore create a mass casualty event. We believe this current risk should be mitigated before relaxation steps are taken, such as those proposed, which further heighten these risks.

TAIC Watchlist: short stacked level crossings and heavy vehicles

These risks are explained in TAIC’s Watchlist on “Safety for pedestrians and vehicles using level crossings”, which states:

“A total of 362 level crossings have short stacking distances with associated risk to long road vehicles. … At level crossings with a short stacking distance, a long vehicle, even though it complies with road regulations, is unable to clear the level crossing when stopping at an adjacent road intersection. … A train colliding with a heavy vehicle is a serious safety issue.” (taic.org.nz)

Key observations from TAIC include:

•The interface between road vehicles (especially long/heavy vehicles) and rail crossings is compromised when changes to vehicle design or road/rail infrastructure are made without proper assessment of stacking, sightlines, vehicle geometry and route queuing. (taic.org.nz)

•The legislative clarity around responsibility (road controlling authority vs rail access provider) for ensuring safe level crossing design and operation is lacking. (taic.org.nz)

•The Watchlist item is explicitly still active (published 21 March 2024) and calls for more urgent action by rail operators, road controlling authorities and the NZTA. (taic.org.nz)

Given these points, any regulatory change in heavy vehicle permitting must factor in the level-crossing interface risk — particularly for heavy/long vehicles which may interact differently with the crossing environment than standard vehicles.

Heavy vehicle risk at level crossings

Heavy vehicles (including HPMVs and 50MAX types) carry specific additional risk at level crossings:

•Longer vehicle length and greater mass: longer vehicles may queue over crossings or be slow to clear once traffic ahead moves, increasing the risk of ‘fouling the track’.

•Slower acceleration / greater stopping distance: heavy vehicles may struggle to clear a crossing if the queue moves forward slowly, or if they accelerate away from a stopped position adjacent to a rail crossing.

•Higher risk of jack-knifing, multiple articulated combinations: complex heavy vehicle configurations may behave unpredictably when approaching intersections adjacent to rail crossings.

•Limited driver sightlines / obstructions: heavy vehicles may have restricted rear or side vision, and in some crossings the geometry (e.g., gradient, curve, queuing position) may exacerbate risk.

•The existence of many short stacked level crossings in New Zealand (those where queuing room is limited) magnifies the risk. TAIC notes that even legally compliant vehicles may not be able to clear the crossing in a stop-and-go scenario. (taic.org.nz)

When permit/plate regimes are relaxed such that heavier or longer vehicles can more easily be operated or the oversight is reduced, then the interface with the rail network may become less controlled — increasing the potential for a heavy vehicle to straddle or foul a track while queueing for road-traffic signals or due to route mis-match.

Recommendations

In light of the above, TrackSAFE recommends the Ministry of Transport and NZTA ensure the following safeguards are built into any reform of heavy vehicle permitting and plate/permit display rules:

1.Explicit route approval criteria for HPMVs / 50MAX vehicles that include level crossing risk assessment.

When approving routes for heavy vehicles, the assessment should consider: stacking distance at level crossings, sightlines, vehicle length/combination, acceleration and queuing behaviour, and intersection geometry adjacent to crossings.

2.Maintain visible identification of heavy vehicle permit status (or equivalent) to assist enforcement and route compliance monitoring.

Removing H plates removes a visible cue for enforcement agencies and for rail/road interface safety stakeholders. If plates are removed, alternate visible identifiers or real-time route monitoring should be required.

3.Electronic/GPS monitoring and route-audit capability for heavy vehicles on approved routes — to help ensure compliance and detect operation on unapproved routes (which may have crossings incompatible with long, heavy vehicles).

4.Cross agency coordination between NZTA, road controlling authorities, and the rail network operator (KiwiRail) on level crossing safety for heavy vehicle operations.

The Watchlist emphasises that the responsibilities for level crossing safety are not always clearly allocated. (taic.org.nz)

Therefore the HPMV / 50MAX permit system should integrate with rail/road interface safety governance.

5.Risk based exclusion of certain crossings from heavy vehicle route approval unless mitigations are in place.

Where a level crossing has known short stacking distance, restricted sightlines, or heavy vehicle queuing potential, vehicles above certain length/mass should be prevented or only allowed under strict controls. Funding could also be provided to address the higher risk level crossings.

6.Ongoing monitoring and evaluation of heavy vehicle operations in respect of level crossings, including incident/near-miss data (which TrackSAFE and KiwiRail can contribute to) and regular audits of route compliance.

Conclusion

TrackSAFE supports the intent behind improved heavy vehicle productivity and efficiency. However, we urge that these gains not come at the expense of safety — particularly the well-documented risk of heavy vehicles interacting with level crossings with short stacking or limited clearance.

The TAIC Watchlist identifies this as a systemic risk requiring urgent attention: “A train colliding with a heavy vehicle is a serious safety issue.” (taic.org.nz)

We submit that the package of changes to heavy vehicle permits and plate requirements must embed explicit mechanisms to manage heavy vehicle exposure to rail level crossings. Without this, the relaxation of permit/plate regimes may inadvertently increase risk at the rail-road interface.